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Article 5

The Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty: To The Client
or to the Institution?*
THE LAWYER'S DUTY OF LOYALTY-I.**

by Ramsey Clark ***

I.
My subject has within its range a major ethical problem of our
society and of our profession.
Law can be very important to life. It is essential, finally, to survival. I would like to think of it, for purposes of this conversation,
as Hegel did in his work on the philosophy of right where he saw in
the development of civilization an expansion of the consciousness
of freedom, with the securing of rights under law as the actualization of freedom.
Lawyers are involved in that process. All too often we think
that law and legal justice can be something apart from life and
social justice, that we can have one set of values and aspirations
and attainments in one and something different in the other. But
so profound an analyst and philosopher of our law and times as
David Bazelon has wondered whether legal justice is possible without social justice.
II.
It is almost absurd to believe that humanity has a capacity to set
aside its prejudices and other predilections in a courtroom.
Culture is lord of everything, of mortals and immortals king,
Pindar said. Law is caught up within the confines of that culture.
It's a slower part, but it is a part.
Felix Cohen has said that most judges and lawyers, indeed most
people, are as unaware of their culture patterns as they are of the
* The talks collected here are adapted from the Baker and McKenzie Foundation
Inaugural Lecture Series: Inquiry into Contemporary Problems of Legal Ethics, at
Loyola University of Chicago School of Law, Spring 1984.
** Mr. Clark's talk, which is presented here in a version edited with his permission
by the Editors, was given March 22, 1984, at the Loyola University School of Law. All
of the footnotes have been supplied by the Editors.
*** Attorney General of the United States, 1966-1969; J.D., 1951, The University of
Chicago.
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oxygen they breathe. Yet, if we are not aware of our culture patterns, our values, how can we hope to judge the ethical quality of
our conduct?
III.
Now let's look at where we are and what we do in our
profession.
There are probably more than the equivalent of half a million
full-time lawyers in this country. We are probably a thirty-billion
dollar industry. People don't think of it too often that way. We
are probably less than two percent devoted to representation of
people who cannot or will not pay money to their lawyers for their
time. If you took all the lawyers' time, which is their stock in
trade, ninety percent of that time would go to less than ten percent
of the people in this country.
I've been saying that for many years. President Carter, to whom
I was not close at all-it was his Attorney General who threatened
me with ten years in prison and a $50,000 fine; I said, "The fine
doesn't worry me, I don't have it, but the ten years, I'm not sure
whether I have it or not but I do have other plans"-he made a
speech to the Los Angeles Bar Association in which he said that
ninety percent of lawyers' time goes to ten percent of the people.
Some audacious person in the audience asked him where he got
that. He said he didn't know. They looked all around. Finally
they found it. I had said it five years earlier.
So they came to me and asked me where I got it and I said, "I
made it up." Isn't that where you get things like that? But it's
right; I know it's right. Don't ask me how I know, but of course
it's right.
Only two percent of the lawyers are in what we tend to call public interest law. All we are talking about when we say "public interest law" is interest in people who cannot or will not pay for their
lawyers.
IV.
It tells us something that money is determining where lawyers'
time goes.
Lawyers are dealing in justice, we say, although there is nothing
in the LSAT or anywhere else that purports to measure the passion
for justice or anything like that.
And if money determines, then we're back before Griffin v. Ili-
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nois when we were told that equal justice under law is impossible
when the kind of trial you get depends on how much money you
have.' Indeed, we are back before Marbury v. Madison when the
Chief Justice said that all civil liberty depends on the ability of
each of us to protect himself from the violation of his rights.2
It is fascinating to read the Scottsboro Boys case, Powell v. Alabama, and think of Justice Sutherland with his starched collar. He
is writing about young men who were threatened with execution.
And he pronounces an extreme and widely condemned principle
that in cases like this, where we are dealing with the illiterate, the
ignorant, the mentally incompetent and the like, perhaps we
should have court-appointed counsel. 3
That opinion referred only to capital cases. But it did recognize
the principle that a lawyer should be able to do better in a court
than someone who is ignorant, illiterate, mentally incompetent, or
the like. By that time we had gone through generations of people
standing before the bar in fear without any effective right to
counsel.
I practiced law in the 1950's. We knew that on arraignment
days you didn't want to be hanging around a criminal courtroom
because a judge might see you back there and assign you half a
dozen cases for which he had no money to compensate you.
And there would be hundreds of young men-and once in a
while a young woman, and sometimes somebody that wasn't even
young-waiting to be arraigned in a terrifying environment, with
no counsel or right to counsel, and Clarence Earl Gideon had not
been heard of yet.4
V.
Gideon had had to plead for himself. You can see the pleasure
of Hugo Black in at last having an opportunity to overrule Betts v.
1. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See also Note, The Supreme Court, 1955
Term, 70 HARV. L. REV. 95, 127 (1956); Comment, 55 MICH. L. REV. 413, 421 (1957).
Compare Boddie v. Conn., 401 U.S. 371 (1971) with United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434
(1973); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
3. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
4. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See generally Fellman, The Federal Right to Counsel in State Courts, 31 NEB. L. REV. (1951); Kamisar, The Right to
Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on 'The Most Pervasive Right' of an
Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1962); The Right to Counsel: A Symposium, 45 MINN. L.
REV. 693 (1961).
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Brady, an awful case. It had held in effect, through the opinion of
a former Attorney General (then an Associate Justice), that the
state bar associations don't believe you really need counsel if you're
accused of crime unless you have got money. Finally we had
Argersinger.6
The slow development of the idea that the right to counsel had
something to do with justice, and with equal justice, was very slow
aborning, perhaps slowest of all among those whose time would be
involved, the lawyers.
I do not mean to say that there were not thousands of wonderful
illustrations of lawyers coming forward, like John Quincy Adams
in the famous case that reached the Supreme Court involving
slaves who had staged a rebellion on a schooner off the shore of
Cuba which was then brought into Long Island, New York. They
were there arrested for being on a boat they didn't own with the
owner not apparently on board any longer.7 But overwhelmingly,
there was no representation, no thought of representation.
In the 1960's, as one of the many outcroppings of the civil rights
movement, there was the poverty movement. It was 1964 before
we had a federal Criminal Justice Act and the first penny appropriated to pay a lawyer to represent an indigent accused of crime in
the federal system.8
It was 1965 before the federal government began to provide legal
services as a part of the poverty program, in the Economic Opportunity Act, with the creation of neighborhood legal services. 9
VI.
While legal aid had been known in many parts of the country, a
place like Dallas, where I came from, had no legal aid until 1953
and then, after a bitter fight, only in civil cases. Criminal law work
was considered dirty business in those days, which is not to say
that many really practice at it these days.
5. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
6. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967). Compare Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
7. See United States v. Libelants and Claimants of the Schooner Amistad, 15 Pet.
518, 10 L. ED. 826 (1841). See also THE ANTI-SLAVERY CRUSADE IN AMERICA: ARGU-

(1969); C. Martin, THE AMISTAD
(1970).
8. The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3001-3772 (1982).
9. The Economic Opportunity Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 2702-2996 (1981). See generally E. Johnson, JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE AMERICAN
MENT IN THE CASE OF UNITED STATES V. CINQUE

AFFAIR

LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM

39-70 (1978). See also The Legal Services Corporation Act

of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1985); see also infra note 14.
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With Gideon and Argersiner we had what has been called the
germ of inarticulate truth, some early expression of the idea that
we ought to have counsel for poor people. But the rate at which
we have proceeded is incredibly slow and the quality is inadequate.
As Scott Fitzgerald said, the poor are different--or something like
that.
Our total legal defense capacity from public funding is insufficient, in my judgment, to provide effective assistance of counsel (a
constitutional right that we ought to insist upon) to a fourth of the
indigents accused of crime.
I had a death case in Texas. The fellow had been on death row
nine years, two hundred and forty-seven days. One of the points
on appeal was that the Texas statute provided only $250 for investigation in both the guilt-or-innocence phase and the penalty phase
of his trial. The case was tried in an out-of-the way place. You
couldn't get an investigator or anybody else even to go down there
for $250, much less to investigate what he was supposed to go
down there to learn about.
The case was tried the same year that Bert Lance recovered,
from the bank that he had worked for before he was indicted, a
million, nine hundred and fifty thousand dollars that he spent in
his defense on a minor criminal charge. In a notorious murder
trial in Houston, Texas, a defendant spent four million dollars in
attorneys' fees.
And here is an indigent accused of crime, with two lawyers, terrified at the prospect, appointed to defend him over their protests,
and only $250 to investigate a case that involved incidents from
Georgia across Arkansas and into Texas and the final fatalities
there.
VII.
There are more than thirteen hundred people on death row today. ° We have executed five this year, two last week. Since we are
putting about two hundred and fifty a year on death row now and
the rate is accelerating, we can't catch up this century, even if we
executed one a day.
In my judgment, from having been involved in a number of
those cases and reviewed many more transcripts, seventy-five percent were deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. The law
10. See Silas, The Death Penalty: The Comeback Picks Up Speed, 71 A.B.A.J. 48
(April 1985).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 16

doesn't have the will to do what it says. That's why we don't execute them.
We are now a generation after Chessman where we held up our
judicial system to ridicule world-wide for our inability to decide
and act." And we still can't decide and act because we know we
can't really make judgments in a rational and principled fashion.
We muddle through, not providing the accused effective assistance of counsel because we fear and hate them.
VIII.
We create public defender offices. We have a major one in New
York City. It's called the Legal Aid Society. It was created over a
hundred years ago. It has by contract taken on the criminal work
in New York City. It does ninety percent of all the criminal work
in Brooklyn, which has a lot of criminal work.12
In all of the years until 1983, no attorney working for the Society had ever filed a workload grievance. No attorney had sought to
assess his workload in a way that would determine whether he
could find enough time to do what ought to be done for his clients.
In the fall of last year, a lawyer was fired immediately after having represented to courts and to his employer (the Legal Aid Society) that the volume of cases assigned him was so great that it was
impossible for him to provide effective assistance of counsel. He
said that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Disciplinary Rule Number 2 of the New York Canons of Ethics for attorneys required him to seek relief.
In civil cases, the vast majority of the public is priced out of the
market for attorneys' services. An ABA study a few years back
showed that two-thirds of the public had never retained a lawyer
or consulted a lawyer more than once. If you're caught in a terrible family dispute where everything seems at stake, including your
children, the law doesn't apply to you in a meaningful way if you
13
don't have money.
You may have all the rights that the government has created for
you, like Social Security. But after the Watts riots we made a sur11. For a chronology of the carher of Caryl Chessman see M. Machlin and W. Woodfield, NINTH LIFE 518 (1961).
12. See Wallace v. Kern, 392 F. Supp. 834 (E.D. N.Y.), rev'd, 481 F.2d 621 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 947 (1975).
13. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 332 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
Gardner v. Luckey, 500 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1974); Ligda v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. App.
3d 811, 827-28, 85 Cal. Rptr. 744, 754 (1970); Escambia County v. Behr, 384 So. 2d 147
(Fla. 1980).
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vey through the curfew zones and found that one-third of the people living there and entitled to Social Security benefits weren't
receiving them. (In Beverly Hills, however, everyone entitled to
Social Security benefits was receiving them, whether needed or not,
so far as the survey could tell.) Those people in Watts had earned
benefits as a matter of statutory and contractual rights but they
weren't receiving them. Courts would resist class actions seeking
to compel the government to do its duty to make those payments.
We live in a materialistic society. We love things. We measure
by money. Law won't be different. Overwhelmingly, deans and
professors of law schools feel proudest of students they have
trained to enter major law firms. The power of the bar is in the
major law firms more and more.
If you take the lawyers who go into the Cabinet of the President
of the United States, I don't think you'll find one since me who
wasn't making several hundred thousand dollars a year practicing
law before appointment, as in the case of Patricia Harris. Joe
Califano, who was appointed to HEW, made over $500,000 the
preceding year, even though he spent more than half of his time
campaigning for Jimmy Carter. Cy Vance, with a more genteel
approach, made $285,000 the year before he became Secretary of
State.
X.
We have various institutions designed to serve the needs of those
with serious problems of access to legal services. It is the dynamics
of those institutions that I now want to look at briefly and the ethical pressures that the people there are under.
In public defenders' offices and in the Legal Services Corporation offices around the country, overwhelmingly the key to success
is to serve the institution. In a public defender's office, the institution has to dispose of a lot of cases.
We have seen case loads in public defenders' offices double while
staffs have been cut twenty-five percent. Now, you have to ask,
Were they doing nothing before? Can they, facing the constitutional requirement for effective assistance of counsel, really handle
that increment? Is there anyone who cares enough to begin to try
to measure systematically what is required to provide effective
assistance?
When we began, we followed the lead of others and said that
there ought to be one lawyer for five thousand poor people. If you
look around the country now, in most public defenders' offices, it
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would perhaps be one for fifteen thousand. But one for five thousand is no bargain, let me tell you. The amount of time that any
poor person is likely to get on his case involving his liberty compared to the time that someone gets who can afford a $10,000 fee,
is very likely to be negligible.
Time in court is wasted if you've got to run a lot of cases
through. If you complain about the number of cases you're assigned, you're not considered to be helping. Supervisors tend conscientiously to say, "Look, we're doing the best we can; we've got
all these cases; we've got to handle them." It's like a vegetable
stand.
The same tends to be true on the civil side. Impact cases are
controversial. The emphasis is placed on handling as many little
individual cases as you can. This is the service approach, rather
than handling cases which can have an impact, such as class action
suits. Impact cases are controversial: funding sources and others
get angry with you.
But you can't begin by using a pure service approach (even with
a tenfold increment in lawyer capacity), to handle the volume
that's there. If you want to secure rights and actualize freedom,
you've got to have an impact.
The Legal Services Corporation was created to deal with these
matters. But if you take the most controversial areas of legal representation today, you find that the Congress has either prohibited
Legal Services Corporation attorneys from acting in those areas or
legislation to do so has been introduced and its enactment is
threatened: gay rights, military personnel, draft resisters. Even
school desegregation cases: it is said that attorneys' fees are otherwise provided for, but the only trouble is that you never get them.
Such cases are off limits.
For anything that's really controversial, such as abortion, poor
people are not going to get lawyers through public funds. But
what's a lawyer worth, if he can't independently and zealously pursue the rights of the individual who wants him? A right that cannot be fulfilled is worse than no right; it can become an insult.
XI.
We can see related problems in the major law firms. There we
see partners billing clients for associates' time three times what
they are paid. We see associates being told, "Two thousand billable hours a year or you're out."
Is an honest two thousand billable hours possible? Is not this a
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very cruel thing to do to a young person who may want to work
very hard? That's forty hours a week, fifty weeks a year, fairly and
directly attributable to a client's matter for which the client can be
appropriately billed. These are young people. They're still learning; they've got to spend some time of their time just trying to
figure things out.
How often do you see them, with family break-up and other
problems, sitting around ten o'clock at night in a fancy restaurant,
running up billable hours until one in the morning? They will go
out for an hour and a half and have their dinner and come back
and work at something or nothing for another hour because they
have got to get those billable hours in. And if they don't, no partnership for them.
The overhead is at such a level that the firm "has" to have it. It
is teaching people to be soft on an ethical issue of critical
importance.
XII.
There's no wonder drug for all of this. It is going to require, in
my judgment, a higher commitment by lawyers to justice itself,
some growing sense of a personal desire and an obligation to secure
rights and actualize freedom, something that you can believe in. It
is going to require the ingenuity and determination and perseverance to find a way to do it because it matters to you, because justice
matters to you. You feel you can make a difference and you're
going to take some time to do it. Of course, if you do too much of
this, some may think you're peculiar, and you may be out on the
streets.
But when you think about it, there are only four ways to find the
time for the rights of the unrepresented:
The first is through people in the legal profession wanting to use
their time for that purpose because they believe it is important.
The second is what people hate to hear called socialized law
practice. What do you think a public defender's office is? What do
you think a Legal Services Corporation lawyer is? Why do we tend
to cut back on such offices? Why do people want to abolish the
Corporation itself, to abolish public funding for it? It doesn't meet
a small fraction of the need. 14 It's the second most important opportunity that you have.
14. See Conservative Think Tank Recommends LSC Be Abolished, Legal Services
Corporation News, Nov.-Dec., 1980, p. 2. See also J. T. Moran, GIDEON UNDONE: THE
CRISIS IN INDIGENT DEFENSE SPENDING (Transcript of a Hearing on The Crisis in Indi-
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The third is through charity. The trouble is that charity, like
everybody else, is prejudiced, just on different subjects. Charity
doesn't support matters that are unpleasant to it. The venturesomeness of charity is very limited, as is its capacity. It can fund a
litigation officer here or there; it can provide lawyers for certain
types of representation from time to time. But it is fragile and limited, invaluable but minor.
Then there is the ingenuity of lawyers in creating associations.
For example, there are six or eight million retarded people in this
society. They come overwhelmingly from the poor. Individually,
they have little power; they have no rights to speak of; the institutions many must live in are worse than prisons. But collectively,
they do have an opportunity. State and national associations for
retarded citizens and many other groups have major litigation
projects, full-time lawyers working on their rights, conceiving and
designing and enforcing those rights.15 That sort of thing has to be
a major part of what law schools teach us to do.
There are other methods of lawyer combination. We developed
what we used to call "a package" for rural law practice in the
South in the civil rights days. You could go down there with nothing except a license and make money serving people in matters that
concerned you. You had to be versatile. You had to be able to
take the criminal cases the court would appoint. You had to learn
how to bring class action suits representing poor people who were
being ripped off by loan sharks and the rest. I don't say it's easy to provide the legal services the unrepresented need. I don't say it's the golden road. But it is possible.
XIII.
In a society that is highly materialistic, lawyers won't be much
different from the rest of the society. Unless we use our imaginations in expanding the opportunity to help, the public will see that
we are rationing justice and creating ethical dilemmas at every institutional level.
gent Defense Funding, November 1982) (A.B.A., 1983). See also E. A. Brownell, LEGAL
AID IN THE UNITED STATES (1951); see also supra note 9.
15. See Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of Dist. of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.C. 1972);
Pennsylvania Assoc. for Retarded Children v. Penn., 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
See also Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461
(1976); Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 180 n.2. Seegenerally Note, Creatingan Implied MalpracticeAction for the Handicappedin New York, 46

ALa. L. REV. 520 (1982). Compare Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Haiderman, 465
U.S. 89 (1984).
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Take the government lawyer. Does he serve the rule of law? Or
does he serve the appointive power? What should an Attorney
General do? What should a young lawyer in the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice do?
How many resignations have we had? Quite a few, actually, in
the environmental law area, in the civil rights law area and in a few
other areas. These have been young lawyers who have been told
that they would not be allowed to enforce the law as their intellect
and conscience told them they should. But however encouraging
such resignations are, they are still the exception.
What we need is some sense of unity among ourselves in seeing
how and why we ration justice, why we have a huge prison population made up predominantly of poor young black men. The law
not only fails to do its duty respecting their rights but often helps
cause the conditions which put them in prison.I6
So long as commercial success is the highest value of the profession, justice will be rationed. So long as we don't work as hard for
social justice as we do for legal justice, not realizing that legal justice cannot be accomplished without social justice, justice will be
rationed.
If we can look beyond our mores, our value patterns, and see the
meaning of materialism for the conduct of the agents of the rule of
law, then we can liberate ourselves. As individuals we can find
ways to pursue justice, to share justice, to spread justice among
people for whom it has been a rare quality. In doing so, we find
freedom for ourselves as well.
Fear will be the enemy, as it is of every human act that defies
cultural norms. I would leave you with Justice Black's admonition
from a glorious case we should all remember, In re Anastaplo:
"We must not be afraid to be free."' 7
16. See R. Clark, CRIME IN AMERICA: OBSERVATIONS ON ITS NATURE, CAUSES,
PREVENTION AND CONTROL (1970).
17.

In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 116 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). See MEMORIAL

ADDRESSES AND OTHER TRIBUTES IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE
LIFE AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF HUGO LAFAYETTE BLACK, 92d Cong., 1st sess., House

Document No. 92-236 (U.S. G.P.O., 1972), at 64-65. See also Nat'l L. J., June 18, 1979,
p. 21; Anastaplo, How to Read the Constitutionof the United States, 17 Loy. U. CHI. L. J.
1, 26, n. 74 (1985).

